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By STEPHANIE K. PELL*
THANK YOU. It is a pleasure to participate in this panel discussion1
of law enforcement access to and use of location data—in my opinion,
the most challenging issue Congress will face in any effort to reform
the Electronic Communications Privacy Act2 (“ECPA”). Our modera-
tor, Julia Angwin, has asked me to address the law enforcement per-
spective on this issue.
Let me start by saying that I come to this issue from both law
enforcement and legislative backgrounds. I was a federal prosecutor
* Principal, SKP Strategies, LLC; former Counsel to the House Judiciary
Committee; former Senior Counsel to the Deputy Attorney General, U.S. Department of
Justice; former Counsel to the Assistant Attorney General, National Security Division, U.S.
Department of Justice; and former Assistant U.S. Attorney, Southern District of Florida.
Email: stephanie@stephaniepell.net. I would like to thank Susan Freiwald and the
University of San Francisco Law Review for their invitation to participate in the symposium.
I would also like to thank Jim Green for his assistance.
1. These written remarks have been adapted from a speech given at the USF Law
Review symposium on ECPA reform on February 24, 2012. That speech was based largely
on the article I co-authored with Christopher Soghoian entitled, Can You See Me Now?:
Toward Reasonable Standards for Law Enforcement Access to Location Data That Congress Could
Enact, 27 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 117 (2012). At the time I gave the speech, this article was
forthcoming but has since been published.
2. Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100 Stat.
1848 (1986) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.). I use the term ECPA
to describe the first three titles of the Electronic Communications Privacy Act: Title I (“In-
terception of Communications and Related Matters”), 100 Stat. 1848, which amended the
Wiretap Act (commonly referred to as Title III (“Wiretapping and Electronic Surveil-
lance”) of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-351, tit.
III, 82 Stat. 197, 211–25 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2511–2520 (2010))); Title II
(“Stored Wire and Electronic Communications and Transactional Records Access”), com-
monly referred to as the Stored Communications Act (SCA), Pub. L. No. 99-508, tit. II, 100
Stat. 1848, 1860–68 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701–2712 (2010)); and Title III
(“Pen Registers and Trap and Trace Devices”), commonly referred to as the Pen/Trap
Devices Statute, Pub. L. No. 99-508, tit. III, 100 Stat. 1848, 1868–73 (codified as amended
at 18 U.S.C. §§ 3121–27 (2010)).
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for almost fifteen years and used ECPA in the course of investigating
crimes. Using ECPA—that is, following the rules ECPA prescribes for
acquiring information in the course of an investigation—is a very dif-
ferent exercise from considering what those rules should be and how
they might appropriately balance law enforcement, privacy and indus-
try equities. I first considered the issues involved in balancing these
interests when I was detailed from the Department of Justice (“DOJ”)
to the House Committee on the Judiciary (“Judiciary Committee”)
during the 111th Congress and became the Committee’s lead counsel
on ECPA reform. In this role, I developed three ECPA reform hear-
ings for the Judiciary Committee’s Subcommittee on the Constitution,
Civil Rights and Civil Liberties under the direction of then Chairman
Jerrold Nadler (D-NY, 8th Dist.).
One of these hearings focused specifically on law enforcement
access to location data.3 Of the three hearings, I found this one to be
the most difficult to develop and execute. The three primary sources
of this difficulty were an inconsistent legal landscape, a strong disa-
greement between two of the three major stakeholders about what the
law should be, and the scarcity of reliable information on the subject
available for congressional scrutiny.
The first difficulty I faced in developing a hearing on ECPA re-
form and location data was that the law in this area is, quite frankly, a
mess. Locating the proper standard for law enforcement access to pro-
spective or “real time” location data—in ECPA or any other federal
statute—is, in some respects, like the quest for the holy grail, the
search for the fountain of youth, or (as the women in the audience
will appreciate) the hunt for a truly comfortable pair of high-heeled
shoes: it is a tale of inexhaustible desire and eternal frustration.
When Congress passed ECPA in 1986, cell phones were the size
of small kitchen appliances. As forward-looking a statute as ECPA
sought to be—and has, indeed, been—Congress did not foresee the
enormous proliferation of mobile devices and the constant “necessity”
they would become in our daily lives. Nor could Congress have antici-
pated the corresponding “benefits” such devices would bestow on law
enforcement: they leave a record of almost everywhere we have been,
3. ECPA Reform and the Revolution in Location Based Technologies and Services: Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution, Civil Rights, and Civil Liberties of the H. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 111th Cong. 81–85, 93–94 (2010) [hereinafter Location Hearing].
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allow law enforcement to track us in “real time,” and perhaps even aid
law enforcement in predicting where we are likely to go.4
Because neither ECPA nor any other statute provides a clear stan-
dard for law enforcement access to “real time” location data, courts
have struggled to discern what the standard might be—that is, what
Congress intended it to be.5 For its part, since at least 2005, DOJ had
argued that real time single cell-site location data should be accessible
with something called a hybrid order: a combination of an 18 U.S.C.
§ 2703(d)6 Order (“D Order”) and an Order for a Pen Register/Trap
and Trace device7 (“Pen/Trap”).8 Some courts have adopted this “hy-
brid theory,” while others have refused to authorize “real time” loca-
tion tracking without a Rule 419 probable cause warrant.10
4. Researchers are developing algorithms that will predict future movements of mo-
bile device users through the analysis of location data in the possession of law enforce-
ment. See Parmy Olson, Algorithm Aims to Predict Crime by Tracking Mobile Phones, FORBES
(Aug. 6, 2012), http://www.forbes.com/sites/parmyolson/2012/08/06/algorithm-aims-to-
predict-crime-by-tracking-mobile-phones/.
5. Consider the congressional testimony of Judge Smith describing the difficulty he
and other Magistrate Judges have faced in determining the proper standard for law en-
forcement access to real-time location information:
Moreover, none of the other categories of electronic surveillance seemed to fit.
The pen register standard was ruled out by a proviso in a 1994 statute known as
CALEA. The wiretap standard did not apply because CSI does not reveal the con-
tents of a communication. The Stored Communications Act (SCA) standard did
not seem to apply for two reasons: the definition of “electronic communication”
specifically excludes information from a tracking device; and the structure of the
SCA was inherently retrospective, allowing access to documents and records al-
ready created, as opposed to prospective real time monitoring.
Location Hearing, supra note 3, at 82–83 (footnotes omitted).
6. 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d) (2006). To obtain an order under 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d), law
enforcement must provide “specific and articulable facts showing that there are reasonable
grounds to believe that the . . . records or other information sought[ ] are relevant and
material to an ongoing criminal investigation.” 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d) (2006).
7. Id. § 3123(a)(1) (directing that a court “shall enter an ex parte order authorizing
the installation and use of a pen register or trap and trace device . . . if the court finds that
the attorney for the Government [in an application pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3122(a)(1)]
has certified to the court that the information likely to be obtained . . . is relevant to an
ongoing criminal investigation.”).
8. Kevin S. Bankston, Only the DOJ Knows: The Secret Law of Electronic Surveillance, 41
U.S.F. L. REV. 589, 609–12 (2007) (describing the first publicly known case where the DOJ
articulated the “hybrid theory” in applying for a court order authorizing access to real-time
cell site information). A DOJ Manual contains DOJ guidance about the use of “hybrid”
orders. See COMPUTER CRIME & INTELLECTUAL PROP. SECTION, CRIMINAL DIV., U.S. DEP’T OF
JUSTICE, SEARCHING AND SEIZING COMPUTERS AND OBTAINING ELECTRONIC EVIDENCE IN CRIMI-
NAL INVESTIGATIONS 159–60 (3d ed. 2009), available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/
cybercrime/docs/ssmanual2009.pdf.
9. FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(d)(1) (“After receiving an affidavit or other information, a
magistrate judge . . . must issue the warrant if there is probable cause to search for and
seize a person or property or to install and use a tracking device.”).
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Even magistrate judges within the same district do not always
agree: there are districts where some judges will approve real time
tracking with hybrid orders while others require a probable cause war-
rant.11 Perhaps the most “cogent expression”12 of a court approving a
hybrid order (to use Judge Smith’s words) is Magistrate Judge Goren-
stein’s 2005 decision from the Southern District of New York.13 While
approving the government’s hybrid theory in that case, Judge Goren-
stein’s analysis of the relevant issues compelled him literally to ex-
amine a map of cell towers to determine the relative precision of
location data that could be generated by a specific geographical por-
tion of a cellular network.14 He explained that his analysis was address-
ing the technology currently available to the government in the
district in question at that time.15 Thus, if the technology changed
over time, his analysis might have to change with it.
Consider the legal instability that results when court decisions
must depend upon the relative precision of location data generated
by technology that is continuously and rapidly becoming more accu-
rate. Indeed, in 2012, we all have the ability, in order to prevent
“dropped calls,” to place picocells, microcells or femtocells in our
homes, which can, in some cases, generate location data that will iden-
tify individual floors or rooms within buildings.16 It is almost comical
10. See Location Hearing, supra note 3, at 83–85 (written statement of Judge Stephen
Wm. Smith discussing Magistrate and District Court decisions where courts have author-
ized the law enforcement access of prospective cell site data with hybrid orders and Rule 41
search warrants). Id. at 93–94 (Exhibit B cataloguing the Magistrate and District Court
decisions).
11. Compare In re Application of the U.S. for an Order for Prospective Cell Site Loca-
tion Info. on a Certain Cellular Tel., No. 06 CRIM. MISC. 01, 2006 WL 468300 (S.D.N.Y.
Feb. 28 2006) (denying application for limited single tower data), with In re Application of
the U.S. for an Order for Disclosure of Telecomm. Records and Authorizing the Use of a
Pen Register and Trap and Trace, 405 F. Supp. 2d 435 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (granting applica-
tion for limited single tower data).
12. See Location Hearing, supra note 3, at 83 (written statement of Judge Stephen Wm.
Smith).
13. In re Application of the U.S. for an Order for Disclosure of Telecomm. Records
and Authorizing the Use of Pen Register and Trap and Trace, 405 F. Supp. 2d 435, 450
(S.D.N.Y. 2005).
14. Id. at 437.
15. Id. at 450.
16. In order to assist with the coverage of “dead spots,” wireless carriers in recent
years have been:
deploy[ing] . . . the latest generation of smaller and smaller-scale cellular base
stations (called, variously, ‘microcells,’ ‘picocells’ and ‘femtocells’) designed to
serve very small areas, such as particular floors of buildings or even individual
homes and offices. The effect of this trend toward smaller sectors is that knowing
the identity of the base station (or sector ID) that handled a call is tantamount to
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to think about magistrate judges, each time they are presented with a
new government request for a hybrid order, examining new cell tower
maps or consulting industry network experts17 to determine the impli-
cations of the addition of a new cell tower or femtocell to a particular
area. Such instability in the law does not benefit law enforcement, in-
dustry or consumer privacy interests, and this example illustrates only
one of several problems that serve to make this area of the law such a
mess.
The second issue that burdened the effort to execute a location
data hearing was that, even though there is general agreement among
the major stakeholders (law enforcement, industry and privacy advo-
cates) that a lack of clarity in the law harms everyone, finding a clear
standard everyone can agree upon—particularly, finding the legisla-
tive formula that will reconcile the interests of law enforcement with
privacy advocates—is an exceedingly difficult task.
The policy position advocated by the Digital Due Process Coali-
tion (a coalition of civil liberties organizations and companies which
together proposed several principles to guide congressional consider-
ation of ECPA reform),18 which Jim Dempsey discussed earlier, would
require a probable cause warrant for access to any location data gener-
ated by a cell phone—from a single point of historical location data
indicating where someone was at a particular place and time, to “real
time” tracking for several days or weeks.19 Given my background as a
prosecutor, I knew this blanket standard would be a “non-starter” for
law enforcement.
knowing a phone’s location to within a relatively small geographic area. In rela-
tively unpopulated areas with open terrain, this may be an area miles in diameter.
But in urban areas and other environments that use microcells, this area can be
quite small indeed, sometimes effectively identifying individual floors and rooms
within buildings.
Location Hearing, supra note 3 at 25 (written statement of Professor Matt Blaze).
17. See In re Application of the U.S. for an Order Authorizing the Installation and Use
of a Pen Register, 415 F. Supp. 2d 211, 213 n.3 (W.D.N.Y. 2006) (reviewing a letter from
Verizon’s Court Order Compliance Manager “which states that the information sought will
only ‘identify the general area that the target mobile phone number is located at the time
of a specific call’ and that it ‘cannot pinpoint the exact location of the mobile phone’”).
18. See About the Issue, DIGITAL DUE PROCESS COALITION (May 5, 2010), http://www.
digitaldueprocess.org/index.cfm?objectid=37940370-2551-11DF-8E02000C296BA163; Elec-
tronic Communications Privacy Act Reform: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution, Civil
Rights and Civil Liberties of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 7, 12 (2010) (written
statement of James X. Dempsey).
19. See Our Principles, DIGITAL DUE PROCESS COALITION (May 5, 2010), http://www.
digitaldueprocess.org/index.cfm?objectid=99629E40-2551-11DF-8E02000C296BA163.
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Why would law enforcement oppose this blanket probable cause
standard that treated historical and prospective location data identi-
cally? To begin with, investigations proceed over time, in something
like a narrative. As such, once begun, they are simultaneously prospec-
tive and retrospective, with each new fact both refining the direction
of the investigation’s forward course and correcting previous errone-
ous assumptions. Particularly at the beginning of an investigation,
then, agents must have the ability to acquire certain types of informa-
tion in order to focus the inquiry in the right direction and on the
correct person or people who might have committed the crime. Imag-
ine, for example, if you were asked to write a book report on Moby
Dick, but you were only allowed to read the first sentence, “Call me
Ishmael.”20 How would you summarize the plot or talk about charac-
ters and themes without more information? Law enforcement, in my
opinion, can make a credible argument that a probable cause stan-
dard for all location data—historical and prospective—will unduly
hamper their activities at the early stages of an investigation. That is, it
will prohibit investigators from reading far enough ahead to learn
who Ahab is—and that there might just be a white whale involved,
too—before they are able to develop the probable cause necessary for
a valid warrant.21 Excessively constraining law enforcement’s vision at
the beginning of an investigation is a genuine public safety concern.
In our post-9/11 world, it could also prove to be a particularly difficult
political stance.
Moreover, when we talk about a probable cause standard for all
location data, we are generally referring to the notion of probable
cause articulated in Rule 41 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Proce-
dure.22 Under Rule 41, the government would need to demonstrate
that there is probable cause to believe that the location information
itself is evidence of a crime. The government may often be able to
make this showing insofar as a suspect’s location (and thus her
phone’s location) would be evidence of a crime: Location information
can rebut a defendant’s alibi, place a defendant at the scene of a
crime, or show that her movements are consistent with actions alleged
in furtherance of a criminal conspiracy.
20. HERMAN MELVILLE, MOBY DICK: OR, THE WHALE 3 (Harrison Hayford et al. eds.
1988).
21. See supra note 9.
22. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(c) (listing categories of probable cause: “(1) evidence of a
crime; (2) contraband, fruits of crime, or other items illegally possessed; (3) property de-
signed for use, intended for use, or used in committing a crime; or (4) a person to be
arrested or a person who is unlawfully restrained”).
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What if, however, law enforcement has a legitimate reason to find
a suspect but the location information itself is not evidence of a crime?
Consider, for example, a situation where law enforcement has an ar-
rest warrant for a suspect. Agents go to his house and he is not there.
They contact relatives and associates, and no one knows or, perhaps,
no one is willing to tell them where he is. Investigators decide to seek
a probable cause warrant from a magistrate judge in order to require
the suspect’s cell phone company to “ping” his phone23 and track his
location in real time. What if the arrest warrant is based on the sus-
pect’s alleged involvement in a health care fraud scheme and law en-
forcement has no reason to believe that his current location is in any
way relevant to the crimes that led a judge to issue an arrest warrant?
Could law enforcement acquire a Rule 41 probable cause warrant to
track the suspect’s current location via his cell phone? Arguably not.
Indeed, Maryland Magistrate Judge Susan K. Gauvey concluded that a
probable cause search warrant does not permit law enforcement to
acquire GPS location data solely to execute an arrest warrant.24 Her
analysis focused on the fact that the government’s probable cause the-
ory was that the “evidence sought will aid in a particular apprehen-
sion,” not that location data was evidence of a crime itself.25 While the
government was able to locate the subject of the arrest warrant by
other means in this case,26 a probable cause standard tied directly to
the language of Rule 41 can, ironically, limit law enforcement’s ability
to find someone when a court has already found there is probable
cause to arrest them. Professor Orin Kerr has labeled this the “proba-
ble cause of what” problem.27
What if law enforcement requests historical location data in order
to exclude someone from an investigation? Under this scenario, the
location information would likely not be evidence of a crime but,
rather, would allow law enforcement to clear someone suspected of
criminal activity and thus focus investigative resources upon appre-
23. Carriers can locate a cell phone by covertly “pinging” it. Such pings can “reveal
the nearest cell site [tower] to the subscriber, or more accurate GPS or triangulated data if
requested.” Pell & Soghoian, supra note 1, at 131 (footnote omitted). For a general discus-
sion of how mobile devices generate location data, see Pell & Soghoian, supra note 1, at
126–33.
24. In re Application of the U.S. for an Order Authorizing Disclosure of Location Info.
of a Specified Wireless Tel., 849 F. Supp. 2d 526, 530 (D. Md. 2011).
25. Id. at 559.
26. Id. at 531-32.
27. Electronic Communications Privacy Act Reform: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the Con-
stitution, Civil Rights, and Civil Liberties of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 39
(2010) (written statement of Prof. Orin S. Kerr, George Washington Univ. Law School).
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hension of the actual perpetrator. Under these circumstances, unduly
limiting law enforcement’s access to location data might, ironically,
serve not only to impede important investigative functions, but also to
compromise important interests of innocent third parties who other-
wise could have been spared the anxiety and possible expense of be-
ing the erroneous object of a criminal investigation.
Third and finally, building a location data hearing was challeng-
ing because acquiring facts that could aid Congress in making good
policy proved difficult. As I indicated before, the legal landscape gov-
erning law enforcement access of location data is messy and inconsis-
tent. Moreover, the recent Supreme Court opinions in Jones28 did not
clarify the issues pertaining to law enforcement access to cell phone
location data. If anything, the Jones decision only added additional lay-
ers of complexity and uncertainty.29 In this particularly difficult and
intricate area of the law, Congress needs information from all of the
major stakeholders—law enforcement, industry and privacy advocacy
groups—in order to judge the necessity for legislative action and the
specific direction the law should take.
Compared with the hearing I developed on ECPA reform and
cloud computing,30 which drew significant industry participation, not
one wireless carrier agreed to testify on location data access. Law en-
forcement was equally reluctant to discuss publicly how location data
is used in investigations. While some details would likely reveal law
enforcement sources and methods or industry proprietary informa-
tion, I think there is a way to have a more public discussion about
these issues. One mechanism that would promote this discussion and
provide Congress with important facts concerning law enforcement
access to location data would be reporting requirements similar to
those mandated by Congress for law enforcement use of Wiretap31
28. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012).
29. See Pell & Soghoian, supra note 1 at 148-50 (discussing the Jones majority opinion’s
failure to address GPS tracking, like cell phone tracking, that does not involve physical
trespass and the Alito concurrence’s failure to provide specific guidance about when
Fourth Amendment concerns materialize and quoting Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 964 (Alito, J.,
concurring) (“We need not identify with precision the point at which the tracking of this
vehicle became a search, for the line was surely crossed before the 4-week mark.”)).
30. See generally ECPA Reform and the Revolution in Cloud Based Computing: Hearing Before
the Subcomm. on the Constitution, Civil Rights, and Civil Liberties of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary,
111th Cong. (2010).
31. See 18 U.S.C. § 2519(2)-(3) (2006) (outlining what the intercepted communica-
tions report issued by the Administrative Office of the United States Courts must contain).
These reports are detailed, revealing for each wiretap the city or county where it was exe-
cuted, the type of interception (phone, computer, pager, fax), the number of individuals
whose communications were intercepted, the number of intercepted messages, the num-
Fall 2012] MAPPING OUR PRIVACY 253
and Pen/Trap32 authorities. No such reporting requirements cur-
rently exist for location data. As Senator Patrick Leahy has explained
in a different context, reporting requirements are a “far more reliable
basis than anecdotal evidence on which to access law enforcement
needs and make sensible policy in this area.”33
When I left the House Judiciary Committee at the end of the
111th Congress in 2010, I did not have a satisfactory recommendation
to make to the members I worked for about how Congress should
regulate law enforcement access to location data. So I decided to take
a more academic route by joining forces with a technologist and die-
hard privacy advocate named Christopher Soghoian in order to try
and develop a legislative framework for law enforcement access to lo-
cation data that would improve the relative positions of each of the
major stakeholders,34 understanding that no individual group would
be completely happy with the result. Ideally, we thought our dialogue
from two different representative positions would serve both to repli-
cate and expedite the dynamics and products of the legislative pro-
cess. Our collaboration resulted in an article that is forthcoming in
the Berkeley Technology Law Journal.35
Julia Angwin, our moderator, makes the point that not sharing
the details of our framework at this point would be tantamount to our
own version of trying to ignore the whale in Moby Dick—ignoring the
sixty-ton whale in the room, so to speak—so I’ll summarize them
briefly.
The framework we propose in our article includes both a set of
standards for law enforcement access to location data and a series of
what we call “downstream” privacy protections to address aspects of
consumer privacy that access standards alone cannot. The down-
stream protections we recommend are reporting requirements, mini-
mization of data, and notice. Given the time constraints of this panel,
I will focus the remainder of my remarks on our proposed standards. I
do want to stress, however, that we take the position that standards
ber of arrests and convictions that resulted from interception, as well as the financial cost
of the wiretap. Id.
32. See id. § 3126 (outlining what the Pen/Trap report issued by the Attorney General
must contain). Similar to the intercepted communications report, supra note 31, the Pen/
Trap report requires information about numbers of Pen/Trap orders applied for by law
enforcement agencies to include, among other things, the offense specified in each order
and the identity, including district, of the law enforcement agency making the application.
§ 3126.
33. 145 CONG. REC. 31,312 (1999) (statement of Sen. Patrick Leahy).
34. See Pell & Soghoian, supra note 1.
35. Id.
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alone, in the absence of minimization and other protections, will not
achieve the type of privacy protections and oversight needed to bal-
ance the major stakeholder equities.
Taking into account some of the issues I have discussed about the
problems that a blanket probable cause standard would pose for legiti-
mate law enforcement investigative activities, along with how a lower
standard might result in the unnecessary over-collection of data
(which includes the location data of innocent people), we came up
with two access standards, one for historical location data and one for
prospective data.36
For historical location data, we kept the current D Order stan-
dard—“specific and articulable facts showing that there are reasona-
ble grounds to believe” that the information sought is “relevant and
material to an ongoing criminal investigation”37—but added an addi-
tional element to § 2703(d). This new element would require the gov-
ernment to establish specific and articulable facts that a reasonable
and sufficient nexus exists between the scope of the information re-
quested and the alleged or suspected criminal activity being
investigated.
This new “scope” element is specifically meant to address the po-
tential for unnecessary over-collection of data. While the government
often needs to cast a wide net at early stages in an investigation, the
new element requires the government to demonstrate that the scope
of the information requested is reasonable in light of the criminal activ-
ity being investigated. The current D Order standard may not ade-
quately limit an over-collection of data. Indeed, the DOJ has argued
that the word “material” in the D Order standard “does not transform
the standard into one that requires a showing that the records re-
quested are ‘vital,’ ‘highly relevant,’ or ‘essential.’”38 Thus, the scope
of § 2703(d) may be “appropriate even if it compels disclosure of
some unhelpful information” as “§ 2703(d) is routinely used to com-
36. Our proposed standards would not change the voluntary disclosure provisions in
ECPA, which include exceptions for emergencies. See § 2702(b), (c).
37. 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d) (2006).
38. Government’s Response to Objections of Three Twitter Subscribers to Magistrate
Judge’s March 11, 2011 Opinion Denying Motion To Vacate and Denying in Part Motion
To Unseal at 9, In re Application of the U.S. for an Order Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d),
830 F. Supp. 2d 114 (E.D. Va. 2011) (Misc. No. 1:11-DM-3) (quoting Subscribers’ Objec-
tions), available at http://files.cloudprivacy.net/goverment_opp.pdf.
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pel disclosure of records, only some of which are later determined to
be essential to the government’s case.”39
So, in a murder investigation where police do not know the iden-
tity of the perpetrator, they may want to know every cell phone that
was in the vicinity of the murder scene. Under the current practices in
many jurisdictions, the police would use a D Order to obtain numbers
of all cell phones that identified themselves to the closest cell towers.
In this scenario, the new scope element we propose would require law
enforcement to articulate and justify, for example, a timeframe for the
data requested. If the police believe that the murder happened in or
around 12:00 a.m. after the victim stepped out of a local nightclub
when her shift was over, it might be reasonable for investigators to
request the relevant cell site data from 11:00 p.m. to 1:00 a.m. Based
on these limited facts, it may not be reasonable for the police to re-
quest data outside of that timeframe. But if the police developed in-
formation to suggest, for example, that the perpetrator was in the
vicinity of the crime a week before the murder in order to watch the
victim leave her place of work, it might be reasonable to request loca-
tion data for that timeframe, as well. The magistrate judge would eval-
uate the scope of the government’s request, which may involve a
timeframe or other elements of scope like the number of people
whose data was requested, in light of what is reasonable for the partic-
ular investigation.
With respect to prospective location data, we propose a probable
cause standard for all “real time” location data, but we expand the
categories of probable cause. In addition to “evidence of a crime,”40
law enforcement could compel “real time” location data if there was
probable cause to believe a person is committing, has committed, or is
about to commit a felony offense, or is a victim of that offense, and
the location information sought to be obtained concerns the location
of the person believed to have committed, be committing, or about to
commit that offense, or a victim of that offense. These expanded cate-
gories of probable cause will address the “probable cause of what
problem” insofar as the focus of the probable cause standard is on the
individual believed to be committing the crime, rather than exclu-
sively on whether the location data itself is evidence of a crime.
We believe that the combination of these standards—maintain-
ing the D Order standard for historical location with the addition of a
39. Id. at 8 (quoting In re § 2703(d) Order; 10GJ3793, 787 F. Supp. 2d 430, 437 (E.D.
Va. 2011)).
40. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(c).
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scope element and requiring a probable cause standard for “real
time” data with expanded categories of probable cause—improves the
relative positions of all major stakeholders. Everyone benefits from a
greater degree of clarity in the law. Among other things, privacy advo-
cates gain standards providing a higher degree of judicial oversight of
law enforcement access to location data. Even with greater judicial in-
volvement and standards that may require a more robust showing by
law enforcement, these standards should not unduly inhibit their in-
vestigative activities. Moreover, law enforcement’s participation in a
system that features tighter, more rigorous access standards may pro-
mote increased public trust in the integrity of the system and, per-
haps, a corresponding increase in law enforcement’s own credibility.
I hope that I have given some insight into why law enforcement
would oppose a blanket warrant standard for access to all location
data, as well as some sense of the legal, substantive and political com-
plexities that burden the very necessary effort to develop coherent
policy in this area. Thank you, and I would be happy to answer any
questions you may have.
